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Introduction 
The increasingly important role many democracies assign to democracy promotion as both 
a strategic goal and a central activity area of their foreign policies deserves attention in the 
overall discussion about the qualities of democracy and the directions of democratic 
development. This is so for a number of reasons.  
First, the working definitions that underpin international democracy promotion 
efforts are informed by other, broader discussions on the quality of the democratic process 
in established democratic states and about the pace and nature of democratization in 
countries with previously authoritarian regimes. This multifaceted democracy and 
democratization discourse includes the heated debates regarding the accuracy and relevance 
of the diverse methodologies for the measurement and assessment of democracy and 
democratization, and those related to the crucial, yet somewhat nebulous, dividing line 
between democratic breakthroughs and democratic consolidation – both of these areas are of 
paramount importance for practitioners of international democracy promotion.  
Second, democracy promotion efforts, whether they are conducted by states or by 
international organizations, do exercise a degree of influence over the directions of 
domestic democratization processes in the countries they are targeting. The exact nature, 
extent, and forms of this influence, however, are yet to be defined and elaborated on, not 
least because of the relatively recent and so far rather limited academic attention these 
external factors in domestic democratization have received. There are considerable benefits 
to devoting more systematic attention to the influence of external democracy promotion 
efforts on domestic processes that lead to democratic breakthroughs in consolidated or semi-
consolidated autocracies and on democratic consolidations that lead to qualitative 
improvements in democratic governance in already existing electoral democracies. This is 
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especially important given the speedy proliferation of agents active in the democracy 
promotion business and the commensurate increase in funds devoted to this goal, not only 
by states but by a plethora of international, inter-governmental, and private bodies around 
the world. 
And finally, only by critically assessing the current infrastructure and working 
methods of international democracy promotion can we hope to improve and optimize its 
performance and ensure that it indeed contributes positively to the highly diverse and often 
idiosyncratic indigenous democratization efforts and to improvements in the quality of 
democracy in countries at the early stages of transition.  
This paper sets itself the modest aim to review the recent history and current trends 
in democracy promotion, including an overview of the definitions and policy frameworks 
underpinning the democracy promotion strategies of the key players active in this arena, 
proceeding to enumerate the problems and challenges encountered by both policymakers 
and practitioners in developing and implementing appropriate donor policies and measuring 
their impact and rate of success. 
 
A universal value or the imperialism of ideas? 
One of the most basic features of the multi-layered discourse on democracy and 
democratization concerns the definition of democracy and the efforts to construct 
universally applicable benchmarks for the measurement of its presence and/or quality. In 
light of recent world events – most saliently symbolized by the US invasion of Iraq and the 
subsequent, if entirely opportunistic, re-justification of the invasion in the terms of 
democracy promotion – it is not surprising that the debate about whether democracy is a 
universal value or an inherently history- and culture-bound construct has resurfaced with a 
vengeance.  
Even a cursory glance at the narrowly defined literature of democracy promotion 
reveals a surprising gap between those who view democracy as an “inherently 
multidimensional concept, [with] little consensus over its attributes,”1 and those who 
understand democracy as a “universal value” and claim, with some of their justification 
rooted more firmly in international policy development and practice than in academic 
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theorizing, that “there is widespread agreement at the political level, […] about the 
definition of democracy.”2 
The above divergence on basic definitions appears to be a natural result of the 
complications that have beset democratization processes around the world and the 
consequent erosion of previously uncontested assumptions about democracy, both as a 
means to development and as a desired end-goal in itself. The pro-democracy consensus of 
the 1990s – informed by the seeming convergence of political developments (the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and subsequent democratization in the former communist satellite states 
and the concurrent expansion of electoral democracy in Latin America and Asia) with 
sweeping grand theories (above all by Huntington and Fukuyama) pointing to the inevitable 
emergence of Western-type liberal democracy as the uncontested universal model – has in 
recent years given way to a lively, and at times ideologically-colored, debate on the 
usefulness and, indeed, the overall viability of promoting democracy. A corollary to this 
debate is another one, which concerns primarily the linkage, or lack thereof, between 
development and democracy in international aid policy, in particular with regards to 
questions of causal relationships, sequencing, and the primacy of one objective over 
another.3 
There is no space here to delve substantially into the various debates, yet it is worth 
noting that despite the lively discussion, an effective consensus does seem to exist on 
certain basic democratic practices that are essential – although perhaps not sufficient in 
themselves – to qualify a polity as democratic, at least in the minimal sense of the word. In 
this reading, democracy is a governance system based on popular sovereignty and collective 
decisionmaking.4 Of course, the debate about the qualities of democracy centers around 
precisely on the attributes that are additional to these basic democratic criteria. On the 
political level, there is also strong convergence toward an extended definition of democracy, 
which includes respect for fundamental civil liberties and political rights, periodic multiparty 
elections that are free and fair, universal and equal suffrage, an elected parliament, an 
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independent judiciary, a free press, sufficient civilian control of the military, and the rule of 
law.5 
It is this liberal definition of democracy – i.e. its procedural fundamentals coupled 
with extended systemic components and their functions in safeguarding political rights and 
civil liberties, including minority rights – that above all has been serving as the primary 
fountain of ideas for international democracy promotion efforts in the last 25 years – the 
period in which democracy promotion/assistance has been elevated to a key foreign policy 
objective of many a democratic state and of international and inter-governmental 
organizations.  
It can also be reasonably argued – despite the seemingly intensifying conflict between 
those who advocate for the pro-active promotion of democracy and those who view such 
activities as, at best, naïve and counterproductive, or, at worst, as ideological imperialism 
masquerading in the guise of promoting universal values – that today there are no serious 
ideological competitors to democracy as a political system.6  
This of course does not mean that international democracy promotion and 
indigenous democratic movements do not face serious pushback from autocrats of all 
shapes and stripes – yet, with the notable exception of the adherents to the Bin Laden and 
Taliban-stripe of extreme Islamism, even these autocrats are increasingly claiming some 
form of dubious democratic legitimacy and more often than not attempt to create a 
democratic façade to cover the fundamentally undemocratic nature of their polities.  
This growing global legitimacy of democracy as a universally preferred political 
system (even if one empirically recognizes the infinite variations in its internal workings and 
in its external contours, depending on history, culture and socio-economic factors) is a 
trend in seeming contradiction with the recent travails and plummeting international stature 
of that most prominent of democracy’s international purveyors, the United States. It is fair 
to conclude, that democracy promotion has, to a significant degree, become decoupled 
from the ability of the United States to project its values and democratic model onto other 
parts of the world.  
Indeed, in the last quarter of a century, the United States, once the sole declared 
“promoter of democracy” in the international sphere, has been joined by other 
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democracies, international organizations, and, above all, a supranational entity (the EU), 
elevating the normative goal of “democracy promotion” to one of the key platforms of 
foreign policy strategies in many, if not most, developed democracies and their various 
groupings at the international level. Indeed, it can be argued that today the most active and 
successful promoter of democracy is not the United States, but, primarily through its 
enlargement policy, the European Union. (It must be noted here, however, that the limits of 
the applicability of the ‘enlargement paradigm’ are currently being tested and it remains to 
be seen whether its central assumptions about positive conditionality hold up in the absence 
of an explicit membership promise).  
This proliferation of agents and the resulting variety of means and methods to 
promote democracy is a welcome development as this growing plurality of democratic 
models and concurrent strategies to promote democracy results in a bigger, more versatile 
toolbox for democracy promoters to draw upon and, hopefully, a departure from the one-
size-fits-all approach of earlier periods.  
At this point, it is worth reviewing the recent history of democracy promotion, its 
gradual and organic formulation as a key foreign policy objective, the growth of the 
international democracy promotion infrastructure, its track record over the last 25 years 
and the challenges it currently faces. 
 
Democracy promotion in practice 
It is not an easy task to pinpoint the genesis of what today is a truly global, multi-layered, 
and diverse community of democracy promotion practitioners, supported by national and 
international bureaucracies and a plethora of private organizations. For the purposes of this 
paper, I will look more closely at the two main players, as defined by their overall monetary 
contribution to designated “democracy assistance” programs, in the current democracy 
promotion field: the US and the European Union. In addition to these two, I will also briefly 
review the contribution of smaller, but important players, including individual states, 
intergovernmental and international organizations, and private entities. 
 
US democracy promotion 
As a result of its unique history and its emergence as a major power after World War I – 
led by a president with clear ideas about the creation of a value-based international political 
architecture rooted in democratic domestic consent (“making the world safer for 
7 
 
democracy”) – it is no wonder that the United States is the country most closely associated 
with the concept of democracy promotion and its practice as a foreign policy objective. 
Following Wilson’s example, especially after World War II, a variety of strategic policy 
initiatives, such as the Atlantic Charter, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin Airlift and the 1961 
Foreign Assistance Act, continued building the US tradition of democracy support.  
The reasons for this support were rooted both in America’s national interest and in 
ideals closely associated with country’s self-image. At the same time, while the general 
American commitment to democratic values is unquestionable, the effective representation 
of these values globally and their unequivocal support in specific cases of intervention in 
third countries has been less than consistent. Like all great powers with a wide-ranging set 
of interests and an even greater set of geopolitical challenges, the US also often prioritized 
its own strategic interests at the expense of local democratic movements, sometimes, as in 
Iran in 1953 and in Chile in 1973, doing so in egregiously cynical fashion. A similar dynamic 
lay at the roots of US – and, truth to be told, EU – policies aimed at isolating and 
undermining Hamas after its victory at the polls in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections.  
Notwithstanding these individual examples of crudely-defined national interest or 
geopolitics trumping democratic ideals, there had clearly been a growing trend in US foreign 
policy to prioritize democracy support, characterized by the increased attention to human 
rights issues under president Carter and, subsequently under president Reagan, an ever 
more explicit commitment to democracy promotion and the push for the creation of an 
institutional framework specifically supporting this goal.  
A momentous step in this direction came with the 1983 establishment of the 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED), following Ronald Reagan’s Westminster 
speech in which he called for concerted international efforts to support democratic 
development and democracy around the world.7 The creation of the bipartisan NED and its 
four affiliated non-profit organizations (the International Republican Institute, the National 
Democratic Institute, the Center for International Private Enterprise, and the Solidarity 
Center) marked the beginning of a new era in which direct, public support was provided to 
democracy and human rights activists via a designated framework of organizations set apart 
from the state foreign policy apparatus. The NED model has proven to be quite successful 
and in recent years many other state donors have considered creating their own democracy 
support mechanisms in its image (existing examples today include Canada’s International 
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Centre for Human Rights and Development and Britain’s Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy, for example). 
In parallel with the emergence of a publicly funded non-governmental institutional 
framework, the role played by various government agencies in US democracy promotion 
abroad had also been transformed. President George H.W. Bush further expanded support 
for democratic development by adding it to the portfolio of USAID. In the Clinton 
administration, democracy promotion became one of the three pillars of the overall US 
development strategy. Under George W. Bush, and especially following his 2004 
inauguration address, democracy promotion received unprecedented profile in US foreign 
policy, including a highly ambitious agenda of fostering democratic change in the Middle East.  
Today, the US “democracy bureaucracy” is a highly dispersed group of government 
agencies, multinational bodies, and private organizations.8 Apart from NED and its affiliated 
program implementing institutes, other non-profit organizations (such as the Carter Center, 
the American Bar Associations, or Freedom House) as well as for-profit contractors (such 
as PACT or Development Associates) also carry out democracy support programs funded 
through US government grants. The list of US government agencies that are central to 
democracy promotion programming includes the above-mentioned USAID, the State 
Department as well as the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the 
Department of Labor – these latter three implement sectoral programs, while USAID and 
the State Department are more generalists in their programming.9 
Under the Bush administration, additional programs and agencies were added to the 
traditional players, among them the Millennium Challenge Corporation (to disburse foreign 
aid based on a conditionality principle linked to achievements of benchmarks in political and 
economic governance reforms in the recipient country) and the Middle East Partnership 
Initiative (a Presidential initiative, which operates within the State Department and 
prioritizes grass-roots civil society support, including strong emphasis on women’s rights). 
Some have argued that while the diversity and dispersed nature of the US democracy 
promotion infrastructure is a positive attribute overall (it enables highly heterogeneous yet 
complementary programming to be funded, implemented and overseen by a wide variety of 
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institutional actors), there have been increasing concerns about the lack of inter-agency 
coordination, overlapping competencies, duplication of efforts, and policy incoherence.10 
Within the confines of this paper, it is impossible to provide a comprehensive 
overview of US democracy promotion efforts and their impact. It is more reasonable to 
draft a basic typology of the main types of democracy assistance the US has engaged in, as 
well as the main assumptions about democracy and democratization underpinning these 
different types of democracy aid. It has been argued that, in comparison to the European 
Union, the US has been largely a proponent of providing support to civil society activists 
who, through their opposition to autocratic rulers, were seen as the key movers of 
indigenous democratic change.11 In this reading, the US has been a driver of democratic 
change in a “bottom-up” fashion. 
It seems more accurate, however, to look at US democracy promotion efforts from 
the mid-1970s (the beginning of the “third-wave” of democratization) as a reaction to the 
unprecedented and largely unexpected democratic openings from Latin America, to Asia, to 
Central Europe.12 US democracy assistance in these regions took a multitude of forms, 
largely focusing on three distinct aims: to support free and fair elections; to help develop 
effective political institutions: parties, constitutions, courts, legislatures and local 
governments; and to promote nongovernmental civic and community groups like fraternal 
organizations, religiously affiliated associations, rights groups, trade unions, professional 
societies, and media. This direct democracy aid has often been linked, yet frequently in 
contradiction, with diplomatic, economic, or even military tools and measures.  
In his seminal book on democracy promotion, Aiding Democracy Abroad – The Learning 
Curve, Thomas Carothers effectively outlined the implicit sequential model of 
democratization that essentially guided the US democracy promotion agenda over the last 
quarter of a century. Democratization was posited as a sequential process, beginning with a 
degree of political opening, which allows the rise of opposition and civic groups that, in turn, 
demand representation, that is elections. Following the elections, the process of democratic 
consolidation begins, which is propelled forward by both “top-down” (institution building) 
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and “bottom-up” (strengthening civil society) forces. Hence the threefold focus of 
democracy aid: elections, institutions, and, finally, civil society.  
Between the mid-80s and the early 90s, US democracy assistance focused on 
supporting free and fair elections that followed the initial democratic openings in Latin 
America, Asia, and Central Eastern Europe. This was followed by a period when support 
was concentrated on building and strengthening democratic institutions, including parties, 
legislatures, and judiciaries. But while US democracy assistance did in fact encompass all 
three of these areas, in the last decade and a half attention has shifted decisively towards 
civil society support. The main testing ground for civil society support in US democracy 
promotion efforts was Central Eastern Europe, where the US had supported civil society 
activists even before the major political openings took place. The lessons from this 
successful endeavor were then subsequently carried over to other regions and gradually 
assumed a central role in the US’s democracy promotion toolbox.13 
Today, it is only a small exaggeration to say that US democracy support since the 
mid-1980s has become almost synonymous with civil society support. Carothers and 
Ottaway rightly identified this trend as one of the most important changes in US democracy 
assistance and while they share key assumptions about the important role of civil society in 
democratic transitions and consolidation, they are nevertheless greatly skeptical about the 
usefulness of much of the policies and programs developed and implemented in this realm.14  
A key criticism concerns the convenient theoretical and ideological justifications by 
government agencies and implementers alike for the almost wholesale shift from costly 
institutional reform projects to significantly cheaper civil society support – by arguing that 
civil society is the real key to democratic transition and consolidation, these policymakers 
and practitioners could avoid addressing the fact that limited or even shrinking budgets 
made meaningful and long-term institution building all but impossible. Yet another important 
criticism focuses on the practice of US, as well as most other, democracy promotion 
policies to concentrate support mostly on a narrow set of civil society organizations, largely 
consisting of presumably non-partisan, even apolitical, advocacy or civic education NGOs, 
usually with limited constituencies. This selective engagement created an unnatural 
disengagement from domestic political processes and left a key part of local civil society 
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without support it could have greatly benefited from. The broadening of this core target 
group of civil society actors has only been taking place slowly and very recently.15 
The last eight years have brought a number of important additions to the policy 
architecture of US democracy promotion, while at the same time public perceptions, both 
domestic and global, about the role and utility of democracy promotion have changed in an 
overwhelmingly negative way. An important addition to US democracy promotion efforts 
was the introduction of aid conditionality in the form of the Millenium Challange 
Corporation (MCC). The MCC has been developed to provide financial rewards, in the 
form of additional available funds, for countries that show progress along a set of 
benchmarks measuring improvements in democratic governance and economic reform.16 
Yet another hallmark of the Bush presidency has been its greatly increased focus on the 
Middle East in the context of its democracy promotion agenda. In itself, this could have been 
a welcome shift in geographic priorities.  
Unfortunately, the long shadow of the Iraq invasion, and the subsequent dressing up 
of the invasion to remove Saddam Hussein as mainly a democratizing mission made any 
hopes for successful pro-democracy engagement in most countries of the Arab world a 
mirage. It was partly also a result of a simplified concept aimed at linking the “War on 
Terror” with democratization, arguing that pushing forcefully for democratic openings in 
repressive Arab states would reduce the risk that these countries will continue to be 
breeding grounds for extremism and terrorism. The somewhat uncomfortable fact that the 
most popular opponents of autocratic regimes in the Arab world are often Islamist 
movements with dubious democratic credentials was apparently lost on those formulating 
the US democracy promotion policy in the Middle East. On balance, and despite the soaring 
rhetoric and increase in funding, the Bush administration has left the US democracy 
promotion enterprise in a much worse shape than it had found it in.  
Democracy aid, while still only small portion of overall government expenditures 
directed abroad, has steadily grown, from around $700 million in 1999 to around $2 billion 
in 2007.17 It is a significant enough amount to deserve attention and invite inquiry as to the 
methods and channels of its utilization. The trajectory of democracy promotion as a part of 
US foreign policy is at once a story of ideals and genuine tradition coupled with organic 
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institutional development and that of broken promises, hypocrisy and the abuse of the 
democracy rhetoric in the pursuit of other strategic interests.  
Nevertheless, the United States today remains among the most influential players in 
the democracy promotion arena, its global reach and material ability being matched only by 
the European Union, even while its soft powers of persuasion and attraction by example 
have been significantly diminished during the Bush presidency. Although these soft powers 
are set to be reinstated to significant degree by the election of Barack Obama, the country’s 
hard power is being stretched by the strain of two wars and the impact of the economic 
crisis. It remains to be seen if democracy promotion will continue to play a central role in 
US foreign policy in the current challenging international environment and under a much less 
ideologically-minded president. 
  
EU Democracy promotion  
The European Union’s emergence as one of the key players in the field of democracy 
promotion is without a doubt a highly significant development, not only from a diplomatic 
perspective, but also in the context of new and successful policy approaches to democracy 
promotion. The EU’s arrival as a major democracy promoter is all the more significant when 
viewed in conjunction with the decline of US soft power in the wake of the damage done by 
the Bush administration high-profile, yet aggressive and largely hypocritical, embrace of 
democracy promotion as a central plank of its foreign policy. 
Since the early 1990s, the EU has started introducing democracy and human rights 
clauses in its agreements with third countries, mainstreaming democracy, human rights, and 
the rule of law in its cooperation and association policy.18 Conditionality, a key feature of EU 
external policies today, was first introduced in the Lomé IV agreement (1990) between the 
EU and the African, Carribean, and Pacific Group (ACP) countries, which provided 
preferential trade access to the common market to these countries as well as financial aid 
through the European Development Fund.  
Some of the EU’s basic documents – such as the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on 
the European Union) with its references democracy as one of the objectives of the EU’s 
foreign and security policies and as an explicit goal of development cooperation with third 
countries, and the 2001 Nice Treaty (Treaty Establishing the European Community), which 
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explicitly mentions democracy in the context of economic, financial, and technical 
cooperation with third countries: “Community policy in this area [of economic, financial, 
and technical cooperation with third countries] shall contribute to the general objective of 
developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to the objective of 
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms,”19 – afford a central place to democracy 
in the EU’s relations with third countries. 
The Eastern enlargement has been the most ambitious undertaking on the EU’s part 
in democracy promotion, although it must be noted that the enlargement process was never 
classified by the EU itself as a narrow “democracy promotion” policy in the typical mold 
implemented around the world.  Rather, it was seen as a comprehensive and highly complex 
process whereby the candidate countries underwent wholesale reforms in their political and 
economic spheres according to rigorous criteria provided and monitored by the EU in 
order to reach a well-defined and highly rewarding end-goal: EU membership. Despite these 
fundamental qualitative differences, however, in aiding and managing the transformation of 
ten former communist countries into market-oriented liberal democracies through a 
rigorous system of conditionality-bound positive reinforcement and extensive financial and 
technical assistance, the EU in fact has developed its own unique form of democracy 
promotion, which, in the case of these countries, has proven to be highly successful.20  
To a large extent, the EU’s claim to fame today in the field of democracy promotion 
rests on its enlargement track record, particularly its success of patiently and systematically 
cultivating democratic consolidation in Central Eastern Europe following the democratic 
openings of the late 1980s (it remains to be seen if the later enlargement processes focusing 
on the Western Balkans and Turkey will bring similar success). The lessons of this success 
were not lost on those looking for a transferable new paradigm into the sphere of more 
traditional democracy promotion. In fact, the enlargement process – especially its basic 
feature of combining both positive and negative conditionality and the explicit use of 
‘European Standards’ as benchmarks – today fundamentally informs new policy development 
toward democratization in the regions of Europe’s extended neighborhood and toward 
countries that are not provided with a path to membership. 
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In this sense, the EU today is more comfortable using itself, its own model of 
democracy, and its highly procedural and technocratic approach to democratization, as an 
explicit example in third countries than the United States, which is grappling with the global 
blowback against its perceived arrogance and presumed design to hoist American style 
democracy onto the world as part of a grand design of imperialistic domination. It can be 
said that while the US, despite exhortations from the Bush administration to the contrary, 
has been losing its confidence as a democracy promoter, the EU has been growing in 
stature, both in its own eyes and in the eyes of those with whom it is engaged. In its 
immediate neighborhood the EU has attained a status as an “object of gravitational 
attraction” and is seen in many ways as a benchmark for political and economic 
development.21 
Today, the EU has a fully developed set of policies for its “neighborhood” – 
comprising the whole of continental Europe as well as the Mediterranean basin – in which 
each individual country belongs to one of three categories: candidate countries (Croatia, 
FYR of Macedonia, and Turkey); potential candidate countries (the countries of the 
Western Balkans that were left after the graduation of Croatia and FYRM from the 
Stabilization and Accession Process); and the countries covered by the European 
Neighborhood Policy, for whom membership is either explicitly denied (e.g. Morocco) or is 
put well into the distant future (e.g. Georgia or Moldova). The different policies applied to 
these countries contain the same normative requirements with regards to democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law, their difference lies in the intensity of pressures and the 
generosity of incentives.22 
The EU’s emergence as a foreign policy actor is intimately linked to its internal 
institutional development during which it has progressively accumulated responsibilities in 
the foreign policy arena in parallel to those of its member states, at times even supplanting 
them. In this process, the growth of the Commission’s responsibilities and mandate in 
managing aid and technical assistance received a major boost following the collapse of 
communism and the initiation of the enlargement process.23 Parallel to the Commission, the 
European Parliament (through its role in creating the European Initiative for Democracy and 
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Human Rights and its gradually increased oversight mandate over financial matters) and the 
Council (through its High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy) have also staked 
out important positions in the emerging institutional architecture that today underpins the 
EU’s various democracy promotion policies. 
However, the EU’s track record as a foreign policy actor engaged in democracy 
promotion outside its enlargement framework is mixed, to say the least. This is so despite 
efforts since the 2004 introduction of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to create 
and utilize a policy framework based on the enlargement model and designed to spur 
political and economic reforms in countries without an accession horizon. In these countries 
the lack of the membership option – clearly the crown jewel of positive conditionality – 
seriously limits the EU’s leverage over domestic democratization processes. The additional 
facts that the alternative economic and political incentives included in the ENP are still 
relatively modest and that the EU is reluctant to trigger negative conditionality clauses vis-à-
vis countries that slide back on democracy and human rights clearly points to the hurdles 
delimiting the use of the enlargement model as a widely applicable democracy promotion 
tool. 
The EU’s reluctance to use punitive sanctions for democratic backsliding and the 
limited availability of funds for positive rewards combine to accord greater importance to 
direct democracy assistance projects as key instruments in the EU’s democracy promotion 
arsenal in countries outside its circle of prospective members. In recent years, The EU has 
substantially increased funding for its main instrument for democracy promotion, EIDHR, 
and as of 2007 its new legal framework entered into force, bringing some significant changes 
long demanded by recipients and practitioners alike as well as increased funds (€135 million 
in 2007). Yet despite these positive changes, EIDHR remains a cumbersome and largely one-
size-fits-all framework, which imposes excessive administrative burdens on its beneficiaries 
and, while it does not require host-country consent, it remains politically risk-averse, 
especially when working in states with repressive regimes.  
Apart from EIDHR, it is not easy to clearly classify other types of external aid as 
falling into the category of democracy promotion. Some consider governance assistance as a 
subset of democracy promotion assistance, but this claim is problematic in light of the 
politically circumspect nature of most governance projects in countries where basic political 
rights and civil liberties are repressed. The strong European emphasis on linking governance 
and democratization, however, is at the heart of the different approaches to democracy 
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promotion between the US and the EU. Based on its own experience, the EU perceives 
governance as the channel through which eventually political reform can also emerge. In 
general, a move away from the political aspects of democracy promotion towards social 
issues, such as access to justice or women’s rights, has been observed recently in the EU’s 
allocation of democracy assistance funds.24 
In recent years, some leading observers have questioned the EU’s commitment to 
democracy promotion and have pointed to the increasing primacy of geopolitics and its 
negative impact on the EU’s democracy promotion efforts in third countries. While 
acknowledging the EU’s success in fostering and assisting democratization in places like 
Central Europe and Latin America, these critics argue that the changed context of 
democracy promotion – the end of the ‘third wave’, the increasing pushback from resource-
rich autocracies, and the disillusionment with democracy promotion in the wake of the Bush 
years – presented an unsolvable riddle to EU policymakers whom so far failed to come up 
with new approaches and enhanced efforts to support democratic change.25 Youngs and his 
colleagues convincingly argue that the lack of an effective new strategy is clearly visible in all 
three pillars of European democracy promotion efforts. Incentives are deployed in a 
haphazard way and have ever more limited impact on the countries they are aimed at, while 
sanctions are only reluctantly and selectively imposed and are often revoked even without 
the target country fulfilling previous criteria set by the EU for their lifting (as recently 
evidenced by the case of Uzbekistan, for instance). Finally, the scale of democracy assistance 
remains limited and much of it remains wrapped inside development or governance 
programs, rather than direct assistance to political actors who are pushing for democratic 
change in their countries. 26 
Notwithstanding the largely valid criticism of Youngs and his colleagues, it would be 
hard to ignore that in recent years a number of factors have lead to a more explicit 
commitment to democracy promotion and a wider variety of distinct approaches and 
separate initiatives at the European level to support democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law in third countries. The end of the Cold War and the reestablishment and 
consolidation of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe; the success of the EU 
enlargement processes, creating additional expertise and positive experiences in democratic 
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transitions; the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the continuing challenge to stabilize and 
democratize its successor states; the political and institutional development of the EU itself; 
the increasing threat of terrorism and the resulting reflection on the root causes of the 
conflict – all these factors have been instrumental to the emergence of a distinct democracy 
promotion discourse within the EU and its distillation into new policy initiatives and funding 
and assistance instruments. This development in itself is significant and it is no doubt that 
the new challenges facing democracy promotion around the world can be better tackled 
with this infrastructure in place.  
As the EU tries to adapt to the changed international environment in its democracy 
promotion strategies, two particular areas will need increased and focused attention. The 
EU needs to be braver and more determined in establishing and implementing new 
principles for democracy promotion in countries with very limited freedoms and ruled by 
repressive regimes. Especially when it comes to Commission assistance, the EU should 
embrace the idea of more discreet and discretionary funding for local organizations, 
activists, perhaps even opposition groups, even if it means less transparency and non-
partisanship as well as a departure from the classis project funding framework. This is an 
area where the EU could learn much from the US experience. As a corollary to this, the EU 
should also explore ways to cooperate closer with political parties and political and party 
foundations, which can bring a lot to the table and can enrich the EU’s current roster of 
tools to promote democracy in repressive regimes and contribute to consolidation after 
democratic breakthroughs. In this second area, the practices of Sweden, the UK and the 
Netherlands could be instrumental in enriching EU policies and democracy support 
programs.  
The EU’s emergence in the last fifteen years as one of the main actors in the 
democracy promotion field is significant and overwhelmingly positive development. It has 
added diversity to the global effort to promote democratic values and institutions and 
support indigenous processes of democratization; it has brought new and distinct 
approaches to democracy promotion, especially through its enlargement process, but also 
through its expertise in institutionalization and its commitment to multilateralism and 
preference for soft power and incentives. The EU’s presence as a key actor has become all 
the more important in the wake of the decline of US soft power and the Bush 
administration’s unfortunate marrying of democracy promotion with armed regime change 
and bullying unilateralism.  
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The EU’s challenge is now to further improve the profile of European democracy 
promotion, elaborate a core set of coherent policy principles and implement a sustained and 
clear communication strategy with regards to strategic importance of democracy assistance. 
 
The best of the rest 
The US and the EU are of course not the only two actors active in the field of democracy 
promotion. Today, almost all democratic states have programs of different size and focus 
that can be classified as democracy promotion. In addition, a number of international and 
inter-governmental organizations have also developed their own portfolios in democracy 
promotion.  
Among European democracies, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark are 
the leading forces of democracy promotion in their foreign policies. In addition to these 
countries, which do not feel shy about their desire to promote democratic values and 
institutions and support indigenous democratic movements (even in repressive regimes), a 
number of other European states, such as Germany, Spain and France are active in the 
governance and civil society assistance field that in cases is closely linked with democracy 
assistance. Another important development in recent years has been the emergence of the 
new EU member states as donors and implementers in democracy and human rights field. 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia have all developed their own assistance 
programs and while these are still modest in size, they nevertheless symbolize and underline 
the trend toward greater importance of democracy promotion as a key part of foreign 
policy strategies.  
Among European countries, the UK is the largest donor to governance projects, 
providing around 500 million Euros annually, mostly in Africa and Asia. In addition to these 
funds, which are administered through the Department for International Development, the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office provides funding to work that falls more clearly under 
the “democracy promotion” category, including in repressive regimes, such as Belarus, Iran, 
or Russia. These funds, however, are much smaller than those allocated to governance or 
development work. The Netherlands is one of the most active and progressive supporter of 
democracy promotion efforts within its foreign assistance programs, providing to almost 
12% of its development cooperation funds to this purpose.27 German funding for 
“Democracy, Civil Society, and Public Administration” reached 410 million Euros in 2006, 
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making Germany the largest donor in absolute terms. In relative terms, however, it is 
Sweden that is the most generous supporter of democracy promotion, its assistance 
reaching 401 million Euros or 24% of its total overseas development assistance.28 Among the 
Scandinavian countries, Denmark deserves mention, with its consistent support for 
democracy assistance, which reached 201 million Euros in 2006 and was supplemented by a 
dedicated Arab reform initiative program.  
Among the new member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, the so-called 
‘Visegrad Four” (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) have so far developed 
significant democracy assistance programs. While these programs are still at the early stages 
of formation, they nevertheless symbolize an important step in the history of democracy 
promotion: countries that themselves have been beneficiaries of democracy assistance from 
the West from the mid-1980s today are keen to join the ranks of consolidated democracies 
assisting democratization around the world. 
Apart from states, the number of international and intergovernmental organizations 
active in the democracy promotion field has also increased in recent years. Within the UN 
system, the efforts of the UNDP and the UN Democracy Fund, created in 2005 with much 
support from the Bush administration, have been the leading funding and programmatic 
frameworks for democracy assistance. The Organization for American States (OAS) 
adopted the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001 and conducts various assistance 
initiatives through its Office for the Promotion of Democracy. The Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
is an important player across Eastern Europe and Eurasia, providing technical assistance for 
governments as well as civil society support. The African Union created a Draft Charter on 
Democracy, Elections, and Governance in 2006. 
National governments, international and inter-governmental organizations, and 
supranational entities are today all playing their role in what has become complex web of 
initiatives, programs, and policies aimed at spurring the spread of democracy on all 
continents and supporting its development in places where it has recently struck root. 
While criticism of democracy promotion abounds – either for its imperialistic idealism or 
for its ineffectiveness – there is no denying that over the last quarter of a century it has 
become an increasingly important part of foreign policy for many countries as well as a key 
tenet of international cooperation.  
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Today, democracy promotion faces a number of difficult challenges. The wave of 
indigenous democratic openings that spurred its most recent rise from the early 1980s 
onwards has clearly ebbed. A number of key countries have in fact shown worrying 
reversals in democratic performance in recent years. In addition, many autocratic states 
have drawn strength from rising commodity prices and from the precipitous decline in 
standing of the United States as the world’s foremost democracy promoter and have 
initiated what has been termed the “ pushback against democracy,” continuously and often 
successfully resisting international pressures to democratize and choking their own domestic 
opponents by depriving them of crucial international support and gradually restricting their 
domestic freedoms to organize effectively. 
The Bush administration’s ham-fisted adoption of the terminology of democracy 
promotion to justify a universally reviled foreign policy agenda seriously weakened what 
could otherwise be a natural consensus among democratic states and played straight into 
the hands of those autocrats who are keen to delegitimize democracy promotion as a crude 
attempt at limiting state sovereignty. In the coming years, the main task of democracy 
promoters will be to heal their own disagreements and develop a more appealing vision of 
democracy assistance, one that emphasizes diversity, the primacy of domestic agendas for 
democratization over one-size-fits-all policies of donor governments, multilateralism instead 
of aggressive unilateralism, and the values that make democracy a universally appealing 
notion rather than those that make it seem like a Western concoction unfit for 
consumption in most countries outside its traditional home. 
This is a tall order, but by no means an impossible one and the current challenging 
international climate might make the revision of outdated assumptions and expired policies 
easier. The time is right for a new and truly multi-polar strategy of democracy promotion to 
emerge. 
 
 
 
 
 
